

CONFERENCE OF THE EIGHTEEN-NATION COMMITTEE
ON DISARMAMENT

THE UNIVERSITY
OF MICHIGAN

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FINAL VERBATIM RECORD OF THE ONE HUNDRED AND FOURTEENTH MEETING

Held at the Palais des Nations, Geneva,
on Wednesday, 27 March 1963, at 10.30 a.m.

Chairman

Mr. M. BLUSZTAJN

(Poland)

PRESENT AT THE TABLE

Brazil:

Mr. A. A. de MELO FRANCO
Mr. J. MACHADO LOPES
Mr. J. FRANK da COSTA

Bulgaria:

Mr. M. TARABANOV
Mr. G. GUELEV
Mr. M. KARASSIMEONOV
Mr. V. IZMIRLIEV

Burma:

Mr. J. BARRINGTON
U MAUNG MAUNG GYI

Canada:

Mr. E. L. M. BURNS
Mr. S. F. RAE
Mr. A. E. GOTLIEB
Mr. R. M. TAIT

Czechoslovakia:

Mr. K. KURKA
Mr. V. PECHOTA
Mr. V. VAJNAR
Mr. A. MIKULIN

Ethiopia:

Lij Mikael IMRU
Ato M. HAMID
Ato M. GHEBEYEHU

India:

Mr. A. S. LALL
Mr. A. S. MEHTA
Mr. S. B. DESHKAR

Italy:

Mr. F. CAVALLETTI
Mr. A. CAVAGLIERI
Mr. C. COSTA-REGHINI
Mr. P. TOZZOLI

PRESENT AT THE TABLE (Cont'd)

Mexico:

Mr. L. PADILLA NERVO

Miss E. AGUIRRE

Mr. J. MERCADO

Nigeria:

Mr. M. T. MBU

Mr. L. C. N. OBI

Poland:

Mr. M. BLUSZTAJN

Mr. E. STANIEWSKI

Mr. A. SKOWRONSKI

Romania:

Mr. G. MACOVESCU

Mr. E. GLASER

Mr. O. NEDA

Mr. S. SERBANESCU

Sweden:

Mrs. A. MYRDAL

Baron C. H. von FLATEN

Mr. E. CORNELL

Union of SovietSocialist Republics:

Mr. S. K. TSARAPKIN

Mr. A. A. ROSHCHIN

Mr. I. G. USACHEV

Mr. P. F. SHAKHOV

United Arab Republic:

Mr. A. F. HASSAN

Mr. S. AHMED

Mr. M. KASSEM

Mr. S. E. IBRAHIM

PRESENT AT THE TABLE (Cont'd)

United Kingdom:

Mr. J. B. GODBER
Sir Paul MASON
Mr. J. G. TAHOURDIN
Mr. J. M. EDES

United States of America:

Mr. C. C. STELLE
Mr. A. L. RICHARDS
Mr. D. E. MARK
Mr. V. BAKER

Deputy Special Representative of
the Secretary-General:

Mr. M. A. VELLODI

The CHAIRMAN (Poland): I declare open the one hundred and fourteenth plenary meeting of the Conference of the Eighteen-Nation Committee on Disarmament.

Mr. TARABANOV (Bulgaria) (translation from French): As a result of our co-Chairmen's recommendation regarding this Conference's work, we have resumed discussion of general and complete disarmament and more specifically of the elimination of nuclear weapon delivery vehicles. This question is closely linked and that is one of the main reasons why we are reverting to it today -- with the proposal submitted last year by Mr. Gromyko, Minister for Foreign Affairs of the Soviet Union, to the General Assembly regarding the method to be adopted for the elimination of nuclear weapon delivery vehicles (A/PV.1127 (provisional) p.38).

It may perhaps be useful to recall exactly why negotiations on general and complete disarmament should now be taking place in this Committee. This will perhaps help us to arrive at a fuller understanding of the wisher expressed by public opinion and the peoples of the whole world and to bring out the questions which we must endeavour to solve in the first instance.

It is hardly necessary to review here the history of general and complete disarmament proposals which have been submitted in the past, even before the Second World War, by the Soviet Union, proposals which at the time were rejected very light-heartedly by the other great Powers. At that time of course, this was not difficult, for there did not as yet exist a multiplicity of weapons of mass destruction, and above all nuclear weapons had not yet made their appearance in the arsenals of the great Powers. The only effect of the long discussions which took place both at the League of Nations and at various international disarmament conferences was to bring about a frantic armaments race and to increase the stock of armaments held by States.

Even after the Second World War, when disarmament discussions were started in the United Nations, the obstacles in the way of disarmament proved insurmountable. It was only after the enormous development of nuclear weapons and the increase in their destructive power, and particularly when the danger arose of their being used in an armed conflict in the tense international situation after the War, that public opinion throughout the world saw these arms in their true light and was able to bring constant and increasing pressure to bear on their respective Governments to accept the idea of general and complete disarmament and to appreciate the urgent need of eliminating nuclear weapons so as to remove the danger of a catastrophe involving all mankind.

(Mr. Tarabanov, Bulgaria)

If we have made a number of references to this fact, it is only to recall the fundamental reasons why peoples and governments of the whole world and particularly those of the great Powers have come to realize the need for general and complete disarmament and to approach the problem of disarmament in an entirely new way.

The recent events in the Caribbean, which at one point caused grave anxiety throughout the world, must also serve to remind us once more of the inherent danger to humanity of the existence of nuclear weapons in the arsenals of the great Powers. It is not surprising in these circumstances that the primary and ardent desire of all peoples is that nuclear weapons in particular should vanish from the State arsenals. We must not forget that it was the realization by the world at large of the terrible destructive force of these weapons that led to the decision taken by all the States Members of the United Nations in 1959 to accept the principle of general and complete disarmament, and to endeavour to find as soon as possible a solution to this problem, which is recognized as the most important of our time (A/RES/1378 (XIV)).

In accordance with the desire expressed by peoples throughout the world and by the General Assembly, and in view of the reluctance of the Western Powers to accept the elimination of nuclear weapons at the outset of the disarmament process, the Soviet Union proposed in its draft treaty on general and complete disarmament (ENDC/2, Articles 5-8) that nuclear weapon delivery vehicles should be eliminated in the initial stage of disarmament, thereby removing the danger of a nuclear war. The elimination of nuclear delivery vehicles in the first stage would neutralize nuclear weapons and thus remove the immediate danger of nuclear war which threatens humanity.

The new Soviet proposal submitted at the seventeenth session of the General Assembly (A/PV.1127 (provisional), p.38) provided in particular for the elimination of all nuclear weapon delivery vehicles with the exception of an agreed and strictly limited number of intercontinental missiles, anti-missile missiles, and anti-aircraft missiles which would be retained until the end of the second stage. The only object of this proposal was to surmount the obstacles which had been placed by the Western Powers in the way of removing all danger of nuclear war at the outset of the disarmament process. Since the submission of this proposal, questions have been asked on several occasions by certain Western delegations regarding the Soviet Union's present position. It would not, however, be difficult for them to understand the present Soviet position if they were only willing to put the correct rather than a more or less distorted interpretation on the proposal submitted by Mr. Gromyko, Minister for Foreign Affairs of the Soviet Union.

(Mr. Tarabanov, Bulgaria)

It is laid down in that proposal that all nuclear weapon delivery vehicles should be eliminated with the exception of an agreed and strictly limited number of intercontinental missiles, anti-missile missiles and anti-aircraft ground-to-air missiles which the Soviet Union and the United States would retain up to the end of the second stage, exclusively in their own territories.

The Soviet proposal therefore takes into consideration the expressed desire of the Western nuclear Powers to live under a so-called "nuclear umbrella", at any rate during part of the process of general and complete disarmament.

One would have thought that this proposal would have satisfied the demands put forward by the Western Powers during the negotiations, but such did not prove to be the case. In various forms and on different pretexts the Western delegations are seeking to oppose this reasonable proposal, although it meets the demands which they themselves have made.

The Western delegations began by declining to express a clear and definite opinion on this lucid proposal of the Soviet Union's, on the pretext that they were unable to form an idea of its exact scope or implications. In their statements they try to make out that the Soviet proposal is not sufficiently clear. For example, the United States delegation has on several occasions asked for explanations and details in order to "find out exactly what the Soviet Union has in mind". If the slightest trouble were taken to read the new Soviet proposal a little more attentively, all these questions would be quite unnecessary and irrelevant. It must be clear to any careful observer that this proposal has been clarified by the manner in which it has been formulated.

However, the attitude of the Western delegations is not due to chance. They have recourse to dubious subtleties, and faced with the Soviet proposal they strive to develop their so-called "gradual and balanced reduction of armaments", while retaining what they call the "existing pattern of armaments" or "armaments mix". The United States representative proposes indeed that we should "freeze at a given moment in time, the existing military situation and reduce it progressively to zero, beginning with a 30 per cent across-the-board reduction of all major armaments" (ENDC/PV.111, p.12).

As will be seen, we have before us two proposals for the elimination of the nuclear danger which are based on completely different conceptions. The Soviet proposal provides for the elimination at the outset of disarmament of the nuclear

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danger which threatens mankind by eliminating nuclear weapon delivery vehicles. The United States proposals on the other hand start from the idea that it is necessary to retain nuclear arms and their vehicles up to the end of the disarmament process, a process which in the United States plan has no fixed term (ENDC/30 and Corr.1).

The United States proposal therefore, setting out from the existing ratio of armament systems and armed forces, aims at retaining it or at least seeks to have it retained until the end of the disarmament process, while the nuclear threat remains suspended over the head of mankind. It aims at proceeding by stages, starting with a reduction of 30 per cent of all armaments including nuclear delivery vehicles.

We must however accept the fact that in the present extremely strained state of international relations and with the distrust existing between States, the very idea of a progressive reduction of armaments stretching into a more or less indefinite future, according to the method proposed by the United States, would start an unprecedented armaments race, particularly in the realm of nuclear weapons and their vehicles, for we must not forget that every Power desiring to have a favourable armaments mix during the process of disarmament would certainly wish to have just that mix when the process was due to start.

Even if we were tempted to accept a method like that proposed by the United States, we should witness an armaments race stimulated by the very fact that a decision had been taken to disarm in such a way as to retain the existing "armaments mix".

We realize that we are still far from the point when a general and complete disarmament treaty could be signed. Although the nuclear Powers have in their possession sufficient armaments and especially nuclear weapons not only to destroy each other but to destroy the world several times over, the armaments race continues and becomes more intense every day. Certain Powers not only seek to find the ultimate weapon so as to obtain a decisive nuclear superiority -- or so they think -- but they still try to effect a vast increase in the destructive capacity of nuclear weapons and to accumulate stocks so that when the disarmament process starts, if it does start, they will at some stage enjoy a decisive military advantage over their opponents. In this way they seek a means of upsetting the balance of military power in the world. That is a good and sufficient reason for the Powers interested in real disarmament, a disarmament which would not allow any State or any group of States at any stage of the implementation of the treaty to acquire a military advantage, to refuse to accept such a method.

(Mr. Tarabanov, Bulgaria)

Furthermore, the method advocated by the United States is not one which would really ensure the progressive reduction of existing arms until general and complete disarmament was achieved. Certain speakers have already indicated the gaps and inconsistencies in the United States proposals. Mr. Lall, the representative of India, at our Committee's forty-seventh meeting on 1 June, 1962, showed quite convincingly that the United States plan did not in fact maintain the existing armaments mix. He pointed out that the United States plan would modify "the present pattern or mix and change it rather heavily in favour of weapons of mass destruction". (ENDC/PV.47, p.12)

We should also like to emphasize that, in the case of the reduction of force levels, this principle of gradual shrinkage, as the Western Powers like to call it, is not observed either. The United States proposes that the forces of the Soviet Union and of the United States should be fixed at the end of the first stage at a figure of 2,100,000 men. However, no attempt is made to visualize the situation obtaining at the outset of the disarmament process which it is proposed to freeze. Nor is any account taken of the armed forces of other States at the time when the disarmament process would begin. It is clear, therefore, that when it is in the interest of the United States to follow the so-called method of gradual shrinkage, it adopts this principle. When this principle does not fit in with its requirements or interests, however, it brushes it aside.

It follows from these few observations on the Western attitude to the Soviet proposal aimed at facilitating an agreement on disarmament, that the method proposed by the Western Powers would not under any circumstances enable us to achieve general and complete disarmament or especially to obviate the risk that during disarmament one Power or group of Powers might gain a considerable military advantage. Furthermore, we must bear in mind that under the Western proposals nuclear arms are retained not only until the end of the disarmament process, but even afterwards, in a form which we do not at the moment wish to discuss. At the same time nuclear weapon delivery vehicles are also retained.

The alleged uncertainties and inability to understand on the part of the Western delegations has but one aim, namely to seek every possible way of opposing the new Soviet proposal, which is of a nature to facilitate an agreement on the elimination of nuclear delivery vehicles. The reluctance of the Western Powers to accept the new Soviet proposal, which they welcomed when it was first submitted as meriting our

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Committee's interest and attention, also shows itself in other forms. In his speech of 22 March 1963 (ENDC/PV.112, p.32) the United States representative, when speaking of this proposal and repeating certain of its provisions, managed by a trick of language to change the expression "agreed and strictly limited number" into "agreed and strictly limited levels". It is not difficult to understand why the Western representatives, and especially the United States representative, do all they can, even by tricks of language, to give the impression and convince members of the Committee that the Soviet proposal also aims at fixing a given level rather than a given number or quantity, that is to say, that it could so to speak be adapted to the conception of the United States plan. In another statement Mr. Stalle, in trying to substitute in the same sense the supposed agreed levels for an agreed number or quantity, asked the Soviet delegation to specify the level which the Soviet Union envisaged in its proposal for the reduction of strategic vehicles, when this reduction appeared to be more than 30 per cent but less than 100 per cent. This is another and not very convincing way in which the Western delegations try to find arguments to distort the meaning and the content of the Soviet proposal.

We should like in this connexion to emphasize once again that the proposal submitted by the Soviet Union in no way modifies the principles underlying its plan for general and complete disarmament. The Soviet draft treaty provides for the elimination of nuclear delivery vehicles during the first stage. However, in order to make agreement with the Western Powers easier, it was modified in the new proposal submitted at the seventeenth session of the General Assembly so as to retain for a definite period the so-called "nuclear umbrella", an agreed and strictly limited number of nuclear delivery vehicles and anti-aircraft weapons being retained by the United States and the Soviet Union exclusively in their own territories. There is therefore no question of a "level" of nuclear delivery vehicles in this Soviet proposal, or of any change in the basic principles of the Soviet draft treaty. This plan still envisages the elimination of nuclear delivery vehicles during the first stage.

We should like to emphasize once more that the Soviet proposal's new aim is to facilitate our work. If the United States agrees to accept it, it would be possible to start a discussion of this question at once by proposing a strictly agreed and limited number of nuclear delivery vehicles which would be retained until the end of the second stage.

(Mr. Tarabanov, Bulgaria)

In his statement of 22 March, Mr. Stelle, speaking of the control difficulties which in his opinion would arise if the Soviet proposal were adopted, said:

"What we need is a straightforward statement by the Soviet Union on what verification arrangements it believes would be adequate to ensure that its proposal, if implemented, would be faithfully observed". (ENDC/PV.112, page 32)

If we understand this remark of the United States representative's correctly, he is concerned with the problem of verification which would arise if the Soviet proposal were adopted. Are we then to understand that, provided the question of control and verification is solved, the United States would be prepared to accept the Soviet Union's proposal and that it would be ready to put it into effect? If such is the case, all that is required is that the United States delegation should say so. For our own part, we are certain that the Soviet Union and other countries, including the United States, would find no difficulty in agreeing on the question of control and verification. This would enable us to solve one important and serious question which affects all the peoples of the world, namely the removal of the danger of nuclear war at the outset of the disarmament process, and it would facilitate the whole work of the Conference. It would also represent a most important step in our efforts to reach agreement on general and complete disarmament.

If the Western delegations would only show a little more understanding of the new Soviet proposal, which is perfectly clearly formulated, the path to agreement would be wide open. The Soviet Union has taken an important step towards compromise over the question of nuclear weapon delivery vehicles. It is now for the Western Powers to play their part in facilitating an agreement on this proposal, which would enable the danger of nuclear war to be removed from the outset of the disarmament process.

Mr. CAVALLETTI (Italy)(translation from French): The Italian delegation wishes first of all to express its satisfaction that the debate on the treaty on general and complete disarmament has been resumed. As I have stated on other occasions, the Italian delegation attaches the greatest importance to the rapid conclusion of an agreement on the prohibition of nuclear tests, and also to the conclusion of agreements on collateral measures, but we should like once more to emphasize that these tasks should not make us forget our principal objective, which is to create a new world, a world without armaments and at peace.

(Mr. Cavalletti, Italy)

The sentiments which inspire Italy in these negotiations are well known — a fervent desire for peace; a determination to lay forever the ghost of war, and to ensure a better future for all the peoples of the world. It is under the influence of these sentiments that we desire to see here objective, sincere, constructive and concrete debates, free from all spirit of propaganda or demagoguery.

Consequently, in resuming once more the discussion on general and complete disarmament, the Italian delegation does not wish to follow the delegations of the socialist countries in the attacks and polemics in which they have indulged at recent meetings.

Certain delegations of the socialist countries have attempted, some of them in the last few days, to give a false interpretation of the Caribbean crisis. Such interpretations may perhaps deceive public opinion in certain countries where objective sources of opinion are not freely available, but they can carry no weight elsewhere. There is no need for me to correct them, especially as this has already been done by other delegations. Thus, I consider it superfluous to reply once more to the fresh attacks which have been made by the delegations of the socialist countries upon our allies and upon the decisions which are now being taken in the West. I consider that these polemics are totally unjustified and misplaced. They can only delay the Committee's work and disturb the atmosphere of our negotiations.

Rather than spend my time in replying, I should like to go to the heart of the subject and examine very briefly the problems which face our Committee. There can be no doubt that our negotiations made progress at earlier sessions and that the situation, now we are resuming the debate, is not without positive and encouraging elements. At an earlier meeting Mr. Burns gave us a detailed summary of the points on which the different proposals have come closer together recently (ENDC/PV.112, p.15 et seq.). These considerations encourage me also to display a cautious optimism and reasonable hopes for the successful outcome of our efforts.

However, considerable differences unfortunately still exist. They concern important questions; the system of reducing armaments during the different stages, and the control and construction of the new world.

What stage have we reached in connexion with these problems? On the first point we have proposed a clear and balanced system for the reduction of armaments which would be relatively easy to apply, namely the system of percentage reductions.

(Mr. Cavalletti, Italy)

In our view this method corresponds exactly with the fundamental principles of disarmament and in particular with the maintenance of equilibrium, both in nuclear and in conventional weapons, throughout the process of disarmament.

However, at the last meeting we heard the delegations of the socialist countries once more putting forward a different system (ENDC/PV.113). These delegations, and particularly the Bulgarian representative this morning (Supra p.6), while declaring themselves the only real champions of peace, have repeated that as far as they are concerned they wish to eliminate completely all possibility of a nuclear conflict from the outset of the disarmament process. That is a demagogic and propagandist thesis which impresses no one. Everyone knows that such a sudden, immediate elimination of nuclear weapons, while evidently desirable, is not practically possible. That we must do is remove every possibility of war, whether nuclear or conventional, as soon as possible by gradual and balanced measures. We know that if in our disarmament treaty we do not succeed in eliminating the possibility of a conventional conflict, and if such a conflict breaks out, it will inevitably develop into a nuclear war. Even if we destroy all delivery vehicles and all nuclear bombs, we shall never be able to eliminate, or forget, the dangerous discoveries which science has made in this field.

Thus, if conventional arms were retained, a conventional conflict would soon degenerate into a nuclear conflict. I agree that this is a sad fact, but we cannot escape from it. We must eliminate for ever all possibility of war in any form by gradually reducing to zero all armaments in all sectors. In advancing along this path, we must also bear in mind those geographical factors upon which our two alliances are founded and which are no less important than the strictly military factors. Any other system would lead us to failure or would endanger our mutual security.

In this connexion we have considered very seriously the well-known proposal presented by Mr. Gromyko at the United Nations (A/PV.1127.(provisional) p.38). This proposal gave us a glimmer of hope for a serious rapprochement between the two systems of disarmament envisaged by the parties. After six months we are forced, however, to note that this proposal, which Mr. Tarabanov described this morning as "lucid" (Supra p.7), has not yet been completely formulated and that it continues to be associated with measures and proposals which are unacceptable to us because they do not take into account those geographical factors to which I have referred.

(Mr. Cavalletti, Italy)

From this point of view, and on the basis of the information in our possession, I examined Mr. Gromyko's proposal on 17 December 1962 (ENDC/PV.93, pp.5-9). Since then no clarification and no new element has been provided by the Soviet delegation.

The Bulgarian representative spoke to us this morning of Mr. Gromyko's proposal, but he too failed to provide any new information -- quite the reverse. I intend of course to study his statement in the verbatim record but it seems to me that Mr. Tarabanov said that, contrary to our hopes, Mr. Gromyko's proposal in no way approached the Western point of view. In fact the efforts at interpretation made by the Western delegations in their attempts to understand Mr. Gromyko's proposal were represented this morning by Mr. Tarabanov as attempts to distort the true meaning of the Soviet proposal.

Thus, in the absence of fresh information, the arguments I put forward on 17 December remain valid. Unfortunately we are still waiting to learn the precise scope of Mr. Gromyko's proposal so as to discover whether, as we hope, it is based on the principle of equilibrium or whether it is just a fresh attempt to weaken dangerously the defence of the West against the socialist bloc. If we have no other explanations or clarifications, we shall unfortunately be obliged to believe that the latter alternative is the correct one. However, we still hope that the delegations of the socialist countries, and particularly the Soviet delegation, will provide satisfactory explanations which will permit us to examine Mr. Gromyko's proposal in a more realistic light and with more favourable prospects of success.

The second point of divergence between the Western and Eastern delegations is, as we know, the question of control. The Western delegations in formulating their proposals have set out from a principle which should be accepted by everyone, namely that the degree of control should correspond to the degree of disarmament. It was on the basis of this principle that we proposed a system of zonal control determined by percentages and corresponding with the percentage reductions in armaments. Until now no concrete counter-proposal has been advanced by the socialist delegations in application of the same proportional principle. The socialist delegations have never clearly explained their ideas on the practical application of control measures, with the result that their proposals have remained vague and uncertain from our point of view. That is particularly true of Mr. Gromyko's proposal. The Soviet delegation has always claimed, at least in principle, that total disarmament must be accompanied

(Mr. Cavalletti, Italy)

by total control -- that is to say, a control which gives full freedom to both sides to search for armaments which may be hidden in violation of the treaty. Mr. Gromyko's proposal appears to involve radical or almost total disarmament in the field of delivery vehicles, for that must be the meaning of the expression "a strictly limited number of missiles". Logically, an almost complete system of control must accompany such a vast measure of disarmament. If that is so, what formula has the Soviet delegation to offer us on this subject?

Clearly control plays an extremely important part in a situation where, deterrent weapons having been radically reduced, a few hidden missiles would be sufficient to give an enormous military advantage to one of the parties and would encourage aggression. It is for this reason that we cannot be satisfied with a control formula under which the parties would declare their stocks of nuclear weapon delivery vehicles unilaterally and without mutual verification, and the quantities destroyed would then be controlled without any proof that the quantities remaining corresponded with those which had been agreed.

If Mr. Gromyko's proposal is not simply a tactical gesture, it should provide sufficiently clear explanations on the subject of control. We know that any proposal for disarmament, if it is to be taken seriously, must have two aspects: on the one hand the reduction of armaments and on the other the method of verifying this reduction. The proposals put forward by the West are complete because they refer to both problems. Mr. Gromyko's proposal at the moment refers only to the first of these twin concepts, disarmament and control. While making clear its ideas on the first concept, the Soviet delegation must also explain its ideas and intentions concerning the second, which for us is just as important as the first. It is not for us to make proposals on this subject. Our proposals for control are logical and complete. They form a part of a whole which, in my view, should be accepted owing to its simplicity and coherence. If we must renounce this -- and we are always ready to do so, for our positions are never rigid -- then our partners must advance proposals which are just as logical, just as concrete and just as balanced as our own.

Now for a word on the problem of building the new world. I was somewhat surprised to hear the statement of the Romanian representative who concerned himself particularly with this question at our meeting of 22 March (ENDC/PV.112, pp.11-15). The Romanian delegation, on behalf of the socialist camp I suppose, showed itself very concerned with and very jealous of national sovereignty. I wonder whether in a modern

(Mr. Cavalletti, Italy)

world where international co-operation is developing and must develop more and more, this rigorous conception of national sovereignty is not somewhat out-of-date. We are here to eliminate all armaments and all national armies. Until now national armies have been the most striking symbol of a country's sovereignty. In concluding an agreement on general and complete disarmament, shall we not be renouncing the greatest of the sovereign rights, that of guaranteeing one's own defence with the means which any country may consider the most appropriate?

Moreover, the delegations of the socialist countries have reaffirmed several times that we have only to eliminate armaments in order that the peoples of the world should live in peace. That is a Utopian notion which unfortunately does not correspond with the realities of life. It is a dangerous notion because it could give rise to serious illusions. In a world without arms the smaller and economically weaker countries will always be exposed to aggression by more powerful countries unless we create an appropriate and efficient international organization at the same time as we carry out disarmament.

Of course we do not wish to detract from the United Nations Charter. On the contrary, we wish to strengthen the United Nations in order to permit it to fulfil its tasks in a world which the Charter did not envisage. I do not doubt that the Charter will be able to cope with the new needs of a disarmed world in such a way that the United Nations will find a new lease of life in the application of general and complete disarmament.

The Italian delegation reserves the right to explain later and in detail its ideas for the organization of peace in a disarmed world. We realise that this is a grave and important problem which deserves very careful study. However, now that we are resuming the discussion of general and complete disarmament, the Italian delegation wishes to reaffirm that the implementation of total disarmament must, through the establishment of a new juridical order endowed with sufficient authority, lead us to a world where all will be freed from the fear of war and violence. It is on that condition that all the peoples, great or small, will be able to live without danger, devoting themselves to mutual co-operation and to their spiritual and economic development.

Such are the few preliminary remarks which I wish to make today on returning for the first time during this session to the problem of general and complete disarmament. I reserve of course the right to go more deeply later into the various points of view which I have rapidly outlined today.

Mr. KURKA (Czechoslovakia) (translation from Russian): When the first meeting of the Eighteen-Nation Committee took place a year ago, many people thought that the convening of this Conference marked a new stage in the negotiations on disarmament, a stage which should lead to the final solution of the problem on which the fate of future generations depends. The prospect of a world without armaments and without the spectre of a nuclear war, in which the relations between States are not brought about under pressure of military force, has been outlined in the Soviet draft treaty on general and complete disarmament (ENDC/2).

A year of negotiations on general and complete disarmament, however, has not justified the hopes connected with their commencement. It has brought no proof that the Western Powers are really willing to translate into deeds their assurances that they desire to achieve an agreement. Yet it is obvious that the only reasonable policy which can ensure a peaceful future for mankind is a policy aimed at eliminating through general and complete disarmament the material means of starting a war. The elimination of the technical means of waging war would bring about the conditions for excluding war as a method of settling disputes between States and would thereby ensure the stabilization of peace and the development of the peaceful co-existence of States.

The development of events in the world, particularly the crisis in the Caribbean area which has already been referred to here and which threatened last autumn to involve the world in a nuclear disaster, confirms this undeniable truth with increasing force.

The ruthless logic of history gives mankind a fateful choice: either general and complete disarmament will be implemented without delay or the danger of a thermonuclear war will increase, a danger which threatens to engulf hundreds of millions of human lives and to reduce to ashes the material and spiritual riches accumulated by numerous generations.

The beginning of the atomic age, which man entered after the Second World War, must in no case be equated with the inevitability of the nuclear destruction of the whole world. In order to avert this danger we must resolutely set about real disarmament, starting with the immediate elimination of deadly weapons of mass destruction and the means of their delivery. Is it not obvious that the implementation of partial disarmament measures while immense stockpiles of nuclear

(Mr. Kurka, Czechoslovakia)

weapons and the means of their delivery still exist, reminds one of the behaviour of a man who pretends that he is trying to save his house from burning down by taking out of it merely a box of matches instead of a pile of explosives?

Those are the considerations which determine our approach to the elaboration of the measures for the first stage of general and complete disarmament. It is essential to take radical measures for the immediate elimination of the danger of nuclear war at the very beginning of the disarmament process. That is not demagogy, nor is it propaganda, as the representative of Italy seems to think. It is a necessity dictated by life itself. Any other approach to general and complete disarmament which ignores the existing situation and envisages only half measures aimed at retaining nuclear weapons rather than at actually eliminating every type of weapon, will not meet the needs of the present time and consequently cannot serve as a serious basis for our negotiations.

In this connexion, I should like to make a few remarks on the two draft treaties before the Committee, although I do not intend to analyse them in detail. The point is that we see the basic contradiction between these drafts, not in the formulations of the various provisions, but in the general concept.

It is difficult to cover up this contradiction by the desire, however well intentioned, to seek for common features or even signs of the points of view coming closer together as between the draft treaty on general and complete disarmament submitted by the Soviet Union (ENDC/2, Rev.1) and the United States outline (ENDC/30). At our meeting on 22 March 1963 (ENDC/PV.112), the representative of Canada, General Burns, expressed certain views on the tendency of the two positions to come closer together. One must commend the great effort he has made to inject some optimism into our negotiations. We cannot, of course, deny that in certain aspects the positions of the two sides are now closer together than they were some years ago. On the other hand, it would be unrealistic not to see the fundamental difference between the approaches of the two sides to the content and the trend of the treaty which is being drafted. It is from the point of view of this basic concept that I should like to make a brief comparison of the two proposals which have been submitted as the basis for the elaboration of a treaty on general and complete disarmament.

At our meeting on 20 March the United States representative, Mr. Stelle, explained the views of the United States on disarmament (ENDC/PV.111, pp.10-17). The representative of the United Kingdom, Sir Paul Mason, elaborated his views on

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similar lines on 22 March (ENDC/PV.112, pp.5-11). As the main link in the process of disarmament both these representatives named progressive reduction of all types of armaments of States, and it is quite clear that in their view nuclear weapons should be retained throughout the whole process of general and complete disarmament, and even afterwards.

The Czechoslovak delegation must state that such an approach to general and complete disarmament does not correspond to its views. Proportional reduction of all types of armaments including nuclear weapons and their means of delivery throughout the process of disarmament would in fact mean maintaining the possibility of unleashing a nuclear war. This relates mainly to the first stage of disarmament. The United States plan provides for such a small reduction of the military potential of States that it does not provide even the minimum guarantee that the threat of a nuclear war would be eliminated, nor would it lead to a reduction and still less to the elimination of the technical means of unleashing and waging such a war. Moreover, it must not be forgotten that the implementation of disarmament measures to the end depends on whether radical measures for eliminating the threat of nuclear attack are taken in the earliest phases of the disarmament process. With the present level of nuclear armament of the principal nuclear Powers, a small proportional reduction of nuclear weapons throughout the period of implementation of disarmament measures would make little change in the present situation. Mankind would be exposed to the fateful risk inherent in the existence of devastating weapons and any international crisis or local war could easily turn into a general nuclear conflict. The United States draft treaty ignores that danger and that is its main defect.

What is the purpose of this whole concept, in reality? The representatives of the Western Powers have themselves hinted at its meaning and the practical steps taken by the governments of these Powers in the strategic and political fields provide abundant evidence as to its real purpose.

They justify the desire to retain nuclear weapons and their means of delivery under the pretext of maintaining the military balance during the process of implementation of disarmament measures. If we translate this into intelligible language, it means justifying the continuance of the policy which is one of the reasons of the present international tension, the lack of confidence between nations and the acceleration of the armaments race. That policy is the policy of "a free

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hand" in carrying out the military designs of the Western military groups. In those circumstances, how is it possible to achieve the aim we are pursuing in our negotiations on general and complete disarmament; if the measures proposed are obviously contrary to that aim?

In the whole Western concept there shows up the desire of the governments of the Western Powers to adapt the disarmament process to the image and likeness of their present foreign policy. How can one tolerate that an alleged reduction of various types of armament should hide the fact of the existence of an immense number of nuclear weapons? The very requirement of the same percentage reduction of the number of nuclear weapons and of their means of delivery as is envisaged for conventional armaments cannot be justified. Such a requirement is tantamount to abandoning the aim of neutralizing the aggressive capacity of nuclear weapons and their means of delivery. For instance, according to certain data which if, I am not mistaken, emanated from Mr. McNamara, United States Secretary of Defence, the United States has about 1,000 strategic nuclear weapon delivery vehicles, including more than 200 land-based inter-continental missiles and 144 Polaris missiles in submarines. After a 30 per cent reduction in the first stage there would still remain in the armoury of that nuclear Power a sufficient number of delivery vehicles to make it easy to start and wage a nuclear war. In this connexion the question arises whether this plan for a percentage reduction is not inspired rather by the desire of the Pentagon to write off those nuclear weapon delivery vehicles which are now already obsolete. But this measure is also connected with a demand for control which goes far beyond its needs.

Therefore, it is strange, to say the least, to hear the assertion that a 30 per cent reduction of the number of nuclear weapon delivery vehicles in the first stage of general and complete disarmament would strengthen confidence between States and would pave the way to the achievement of general and complete disarmament.

The disarmament plan put forward by the Western delegations has in fact very little in common with the practical implementation of the principles agreed between the United States and the Soviet Union (ENDC/5) and confirmed by the General Assembly (A/RES/1722(XVI)).

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In this connexion there is yet another characteristic circumstance which is not without interest. In the United States draft submitted to our Committee, a good deal is said about increasing the role of international law in relations between States. But let us see what the reality is. At the last session of the United Nations General Assembly, the Czechoslovak delegation proposed the adoption of a solemn declaration of the principles of international law in respect of friendly relations and co-operation between States. These included all the main principles, on the strict observance of which depends the maintenance of peace and international security. The aim of this measure was to achieve reciprocal confirmation of the rules governing the conduct of States in their relations with each other, and thereby strengthen the foundations underlying international peace and security. What, however, was the reaction of the Western Powers to this step of Czechoslovakia? Using the usual arguments about the superfluous repetition of legal obligations already contained in the Charter of the United Nations and in other instruments of international law, the Western Powers opposed the adoption of this declaration. But to the honour of the majority of States members of the United Nations, it must be said that in spite of the stubborn opposition of the United States to strengthening the foundations of peaceful relations between States in this way, the General Assembly decided to proceed at the forthcoming session to a discussion and proclamation of the main principles of international law with a view to increasing its role in present-day international relations (A/RES/1815(XVII)).

This fact is an additional characteristic of the real attitude of the Western Powers towards measures aimed at general and complete disarmament.

We are convinced that in the present situation it is essential to choose the only way to agreement, namely, to adopt as the basis of a disarmament plan such a sequence and range of disarmament measures in each stage as would ensure the effective elimination of the threat of war, particularly of nuclear war.

This means that we must reject the policy of a partial, slight limitation of the most important types of armament which, in the event of its being carried out consistently, would not provide even a minimal guarantee of international security, but would act rather in the opposite way.

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We are convinced that the way to general and complete disarmament is entirely realistic. The expectation that our Committee will fulfil the task with which it has been entrusted is all the more justified by the fact that we now have at our disposal a suitable basis on which the various parts of a treaty on general and complete disarmament can be built. I am referring to the draft treaty proposed by the Government of the Soviet Union, including the additions and amendments introduced into it by the Soviet Union last year, about which Mr. Tsarapkin spoke again on 20 March 1963 (ENDC/PV.111, pp.25-36).

It is well known that the socialist countries have always endeavoured to secure that from the very start of the implementation of a disarmament programme measures should be undertaken which would really preclude any possibility of a nuclear conflict.

Precisely that point of view was taken into consideration by the Government of the Soviet Union when elaborating its draft treaty on general and complete disarmament. Under the Soviet draft, in the very first stage of general and complete disarmament, radical measures would be taken which would substantially reduce the threat of armed conflict and, in particular, nuclear war. We see in this the unquestionable advantage of the Soviet draft over the United States concept.

But the Soviet draft treaty on general and complete disarmament also takes into consideration a number of other aspects which should be reflected in any realistic disarmament project. First of all, it consistently complies with the principle that throughout the process of general and complete disarmament the security of all States parties to the treaty should be ensured to an equal extent and that no State should gain a unilateral advantage which might be used to the detriment of the interests of other States. It fully provides also that each disarmament measure should be carried out under reliable and effective control which, however, by its scope and nature would not exceed the limits of the corresponding disarmament measures, since otherwise it might seriously jeopardize the legitimate security interests of individual States.

All these criteria were consistently applied when the first stage was worked out in the Soviet draft treaty on general and complete disarmament. It is well-known that the Soviet Union's original draft (ENDC/2, article 4) provided that there would

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take place in the first stage the complete elimination of all nuclear weapon delivery vehicles together with the dismantling of all military bases on the territory of foreign States, the withdrawal of foreign troops and a reduction of the number of armed forces to an agreed level.

There can be no doubt that the implementation of these measures in the first stage would substantially help to reduce the danger of war, and first of all a nuclear war. The elimination of all nuclear weapon delivery vehicles would have the result that already is in this phase of disarmament that is, while nuclear weapons would still exist, their neutralization would be guaranteed and their use would in fact be made impossible. During our earlier negotiations the socialist countries on several occasions stated that they were prepared to take at the very first stage an even more radical measure which would finally put an end to the threat of nuclear war, namely, the complete elimination of nuclear weapons. But in view of the objections of the Western countries to the implementation of such a measure in the initial stage of disarmament, they agreed to the elimination of nuclear weapon delivery vehicles as a first step towards the complete prevention of nuclear war.

In a situation in which all nuclear weapon delivery vehicles had been completely destroyed, the danger of war would be reduced and, at the same time, equal security would be ensured for all States, by the implementation of another measure proposed by the Soviet Union for the first stage of general and complete disarmament, namely, the dismantling of all foreign military bases and the withdrawal of foreign troops from the territory of other States. It cannot be denied that foreign military bases established contrary to the interests of the peoples of the countries concerned are a constant source of international tension and one of the main causes of distrust in relations between States. As a result of their existence, centres of tension and distrust are scattered practically all over the world.

We are convinced, therefore, and have stated repeatedly in the past, that the dismantling of bases on foreign territory would be an important contribution towards consolidating peace and reducing the danger of a nuclear war.

There is another reason why the dismantling of foreign military bases and the withdrawal of foreign troops from the territory of other States are inseparably linked with the elimination of nuclear weapon delivery vehicles in the first stage of general and complete disarmament. On many occasions in our negotiations stress has quite

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rightly been laid on a principle which was also laid down in the Joint Statement of Agreed Principles for Disarmament Negotiations of the Governments of the Soviet Union and the United States of America. I am referring to document ENDC/5. Article 5 of that document reads:

"All measures of general and complete disarmament should be balanced so that at no stage of the implementation of the treaty could any State or group of States gain military advantage and that security is ensured equally for all". (ENDC/5, p.2)

There is no secret about the role assigned to the United States military bases located on the territory of other States, often in the immediate vicinity of the boundaries of socialist countries.

As long as there are United States bases on the territory of other States, the Soviet Union's intercontinental missiles are their necessary counterweight which deters those who might wish to attempt to carry out their aggressive plans with the help of these bases. It would be unrealistic to require the Soviet Union to destroy its principal means of defence while the Western Powers keep intact their bases on foreign territory, where the principal means for attacking the socialist countries are located. We therefore consider it to be a perfectly fair requirement that the elimination of nuclear weapon delivery vehicles in the first stage of general and complete disarmament should be linked with the dismantling of foreign military bases and the withdrawal of foreign troops from the territory of other States.

However, in spite of the logic of this requirement, the delegations of the Western Powers in our negotiations have so far systematically rejected such measures. That applies both to the proposal for the elimination of nuclear weapon delivery vehicles and to the proposal for the dismantling of foreign bases and the withdrawal of foreign troops from the territory of other States. They have tried to justify their negative attitude with various objections which have already been rebutted on many occasions in the past by the delegations of the socialist countries. Therefore I do not consider it necessary to deal with those objections again, although the delegations of the Western Powers go on repeating them.

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The delegations of the Western Powers have taken a negative attitude not only towards the original proposals of the Soviet Union but also towards a number of subsequent proposals aimed at bringing the positions closer together. This was shown very clearly in their attitude towards the proposal submitted by the Minister for Foreign Affairs of the Soviet Union, Mr. Gromyko, at the seventeenth session of the United Nations General Assembly (A/PV.1127 (provisional) p.38), which was discussed by this Committee last December. I am referring to the proposal that when nuclear weapon delivery vehicles are eliminated in the first stage of general and complete disarmament, the Soviet Union and the United States should retain a certain strictly limited and agreed number of missiles, which would be located exclusively on their own territory and would only be eliminated by the end of the second stage. In his statement on 20 March 1963 (ENDC/PV.111, pp.25-36), the representative of the Soviet Union, Mr. Tsarapkin, explained once again in detail the substance and purpose of the new Soviet proposal. I should like to state that we regard this proposal as an important step towards meeting the position of the West in order to overcome the existing obstacles in the way of agreement. We think that on that basis we should very quickly be able to achieve agreement on the measures for the first stage of general and complete disarmament so that from the very outset of the disarmament process a decisive step is taken towards eliminating the threat of a thermonuclear war.

One might have supposed that this desire of the Soviet Government to achieve a compromise solution of the problem would meet with a positive response on the part of the Western delegations. However, we are compelled to note with regret that the reaction of the Western Powers has been and still is just the opposite. At first their representatives adopted a non-committal attitude towards this proposal, and gradually a more clearly expressed negative attitude. Moreover, we have heard again the familiar assertion that the adoption of such a new measure would lead to disturbing some sort of balance and would give unilateral advantages to the socialist countries. However, these objections of the Western Powers to the new Soviet proposal are just as groundless, if not more so, than their objections to an earlier proposal.

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A similar situation exists in regard to the problem of control, which the representatives of the Western Powers are now trying to work up in connexion with this plan of the Soviet Union for solving the problem of nuclear weapon delivery vehicles. Even earlier, before the Soviet Union submitted this new proposal, there were unwarranted attempts by the Western representatives to exaggerate the danger that some State, in spite of the obligation assumed by it under a treaty on general and complete disarmament, might try to conceal the most dangerous types of weapons, as a result of which the existing balance of power would be disturbed. This fact is now all the more obvious. On the one hand, the Soviet Union and the United States would retain a strictly limited number of missiles necessary for ensuring the security of States and capable of stopping any aggressor who might attempt to violate the treaty. On the other hand, the establishment of control machinery and the systematic control it would exercise over the implementation of the relevant disarmament measures would in fact preclude any possibility of any of the States parties to the treaty violating its obligations and concealing missiles or other means of delivery of nuclear weapons.

We are of the opinion that the proposal submitted by the Minister for Foreign Affairs of the Soviet Union, Mr. Gromyko, at the seventeenth session of the United Nations General Assembly and the analysis of that proposal put forward in our Committee are so clear that, given good will and genuine willingness on the part of the Western States to achieve progress in the negotiations on general and complete disarmament, that proposal can straight away become an instrument for overcoming the present difficulties in our negotiations.

In conclusion, I must note the abnormal situation which has arisen in our negotiations on this question. On the one hand, all the participants, including the representatives of the Western Powers, recognize and proclaim the urgency and importance of general and complete disarmament, while, on the other hand, the delegations of the Western Powers adopt a systematically negative position in regard to the implementation of any effective measures -- I stress, effective measures -- which could lead to its accomplishment. As a result of this, up to the present day, that is after more than a

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year since the beginning of its work in the negotiations on general and complete disarmament the Committee has achieved only the smallest results. This state of affairs is not at all encouraging, especially when we see that the Western Powers are continuing outside this Committee to pursue a policy of intensifying the nuclear armaments race, creating new hotbeds of war, spreading nuclear weapons to new States, including Western Germany, and taking other steps which create new obstacles in the path of the disarmament negotiations.

We have a paradoxical situation: while disarmament negotiations are being conducted in this Committee, as in other international bodies previously the Western Powers steadfastly continue to pursue a policy, the basis of which was laid down at the NATO Council in December 1959, that is a month after the United Nations General Assembly had adopted its resolution on disarmament (A/RES/1378 (XIV)). In other words, they continue to pursue a policy, the gist of which consists in balancing on the brink between war and peace. That is the external background of our negotiations and we cannot disregard it.

Of course, we are not referring to that background and to those events in order to develop propaganda, as the representative of Italy seems to think and accuses us of doing, but simply in order to provide an opportunity to consider the problems in all their aspects.

It can hardly be doubted that the intensified accumulation of the nuclear missile potential, the direct and indirect threats of its use and the systematic measures of a political, military and administrative nature aimed at spreading nuclear weapons to other States -- it can hardly be doubted, I repeat, that all these measures are essentially directed against our endeavour to achieve general and complete disarmament.

In this situation, the legitimate question arises whether there is any possibility of finding a way to bring the positions really closer together so as to create an acceptable basis for an agreement. We believe that such favourable conditions can be brought about, if the Western Powers' approach to this problem is dictated not by military and strategic motives but by sober political considerations and a sense of reality. Then our further negotiations on general and complete disarmament would produce more satisfactory results.

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We should like to express the hope that the responsible leaders in the West will realize that all plans for settling relations between the capitalist and the socialist countries from a position of strength, that is, by means of war, are illusory. If they can grasp this truth, it will be helpful not only to our negotiations, but also to the cause of the security of all countries, irrespective of their social system or international position.

Over the past year the socialist countries have shown that for the sake of achieving an agreement they are prepared to seek patiently to come to terms and to make important concessions. It is now up to the Western Powers to assess correctly the fact that the flexible attitude of the Soviet Government has brought about the requisite favourable conditions to enable our negotiations on general and complete disarmament to move forward at last.

Mr. TSARAPKIN (Union of Soviet Socialist Republics) (translation from Russian): The statements made by various representatives at our meeting on 22 March (ENDC/PV.112), when we discussed the question of general and complete disarmament, were a graphic demonstration of their profound interest in the Soviet Government's proposal that the Soviet Union and the United States should retain, during the first and second stages of general and complete disarmament, a strictly limited, agreed number of certain types of missiles (A/PV.1127, (provisional), pp.38-40). This fact shows that the members of the Committee recognize that this Soviet proposal opens up wide possibilities for overcoming our differences and solving one of the main problems of general and complete disarmament. Such interest in our proposal was manifested, in particular, by the representative of India, Mr. Lall, who pointed out that this new Soviet proposal was a compromise (ENDC/PV.112, p.33).

That is undoubtedly a correct evaluation. The Soviet Government's proposal was indeed put forward with the aim of finding a mutually acceptable solution to this problem. What is the gist of the compromise proposed by the Soviet Union? It is assumed that the members of the Committee remember that at the very beginning of the work of the Eighteen-Nation Committee there was a clash between two points of view, two approaches, with regard to establishing the scope and order of priority of disarmament measures in stage I of the programme of general and complete disarmament. The Soviet Union proposed a radical approach to disarmament, while a diametrically opposite approach was put forward by the Western Powers.

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The Soviet Government considered and still considers it essential that all nuclear weapon delivery vehicles without exception should be eliminated in the very first stage of disarmament. This radical approach to disarmament, as proposed by the Soviet Union, makes it possible to eliminate without delay the principal danger now hanging over all peoples -- the danger of a thermonuclear war. Once this is achieved, we shall have created favourable conditions for a speedy and effective implementation of the entire programme of general and complete disarmament. No considerations or arguments can obscure the simple and obvious fact that a real guarantee against the outbreak of a nuclear war can be provided either by the elimination of the nuclear weapons themselves or by the destruction of the means of their delivery. No intermediate steps or halfway measures and no palliatives can lead to the achievement of this aim.

Much has been said here to the effect that disarmament and the strengthening of confidence between States must go hand in hand. In this matter, however, we must not lose sight of the fact that disarmament in itself will foster and generate confidence. Indeed, when a State sees that its neighbour or another State, the relations with which at present leave much to be desired, is likewise destroying its armaments at the same time and is dismantling its military establishment, then of course this fact in itself will undoubtedly generate mutual confidence between States. But all this is true only in the case of real measures of general and complete disarmament.

But if the disarmament programme is drawn up in such a way that there are no guarantees that the disarmament process will not be interrupted at some point and that the world will not return to the present tense situation and to a new round of the desperate armaments race, then of course it would be difficult to expect mutual confidence to emerge. Can we really expect any growth of confidence if the material means for waging a nuclear missile war are not eliminated at the very beginning of disarmament and, consequently, if the danger of an outbreak of nuclear war is not removed and if the peoples of the world continue to live as before under conditions

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of constant fear of a nuclear catastrophe? Of course not. Now no one can any longer deny that a successful solution to the problem of disarmament requires the elimination at the very outset of everything that creates a threat of nuclear war. This indeed is now the criterion and yardstick by which we can judge unerringly whether any given plan or programme guarantees a solution to this problem. Anyone who has had a chance to study the Soviet proposals (ENDC/2, Rev.1) objectively and without prejudice will say that they fulfil this requirement completely. That is their merit and their advantage.

Of course, the best thing for a successful solution to the problem of general and complete disarmament would be for the Western Powers, having realistically evaluated the existing situation, to accept the Soviet proposals. We can say frankly that no one would lose anything by this, that everyone would only stand to gain. After all, the Soviet proposals have been worked out in such a way that they correspond equally to the interests of all peoples without exception -- the peoples of the non-aligned countries, the socialist countries, as well as the American, British and other peoples. All the peoples demand the radical elimination of the threat of a nuclear missile war.

Unfortunately, the Western Powers are unwilling to agree to the complete elimination of all nuclear weapon delivery vehicles in the first stage of disarmament. There is no need to dwell again in detail on their objections. Enough has been said about them already. How unfounded and far-fetched are the objections of the Western Powers to the complete elimination of nuclear weapon delivery vehicles in the first stage of disarmament has been exhaustively shown in our previous statements and in the statements of a number of representatives, in particular in the statement of the representative of Poland.

I should now like to dwell on another matter. Desiring to contribute as much as possible to the rapid progress of our negotiations, the Soviet Union decided to take an important step towards meeting the Western Powers which would help them dispel their doubts and fears, although, speaking frankly, we do not consider these doubts and fears well-founded. Our step towards meeting the position of the Western Powers, as we have already indicated, took the form of agreement by the Soviet Government that in the first and second stages of disarmament the Soviet Union and the United States should keep at their disposal an agreed, strictly limited number of intercontinental missiles, anti-missile missiles and air-defence missiles in the "ground-to-air" category.

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In the earlier stages of our negotiations, the Western Powers stated in the Committee that they could not agree to the elimination of nuclear weapon delivery vehicles at the beginning of the disarmament programme unless additional security guarantees were provided. Speaking frankly, what would constitute a better security guarantee for all States, including the Western States, than the neutralization or, rather, the complete immobilization of all nuclear weapons? But the Western Powers will not accept this. In order to break the deadlock, the Soviet Union decided to meet the Western Powers and made corresponding changes in its proposals. Our Western colleagues can now have no grounds for objecting to an agreement to eliminate in the first stage nuclear weapon delivery vehicles apart from an agreed number of missiles to be retained until the second stage. After all, the Soviet proposal for the retention by the Soviet Union and the United States until the second stage of a strictly limited number of intercontinental missiles, anti-missile missiles and air-defence missiles, is a concession by the Soviet Union to the position of the Western Powers for the sake of achieving an agreement on disarmament. This concession --- and we deem it appropriate to emphasize this again -- was made by us in answer to the statements of the Governments of the Western Powers that in order to agree to this Soviet proposal they would require additional guarantees for the security of States during the process of disarmament.

So, for the sake of achieving an agreement, the Soviet Government agreed to a compromise with the Western Powers. But this compromise of ours is not contrary to the basic idea of our proposal, namely, to avert the threat of a nuclear missile war. Naturally we will not agree to any concessions which would be contrary to this basic idea and which would in fact reduce it to nought. In this matter there can be no weakening. The danger of a nuclear war must be eliminated without delay, and it is to this aim that the programme for the first stage of disarmament must be devoted.

If we examine the United States proposals (ENDC/30) in the light of this criterion, we inevitably come to the conclusion that they avoid the solution of the main problem -- the elimination of the threat of nuclear war. If the United States disarmament plan were to be accepted and carried out, the result would be that the possibility for waging a nuclear war would be retained for ever. The United States approach, as you see, is a basically false one. That is what makes the United States disarmament plan unacceptable to all those who really wish for peace and disarmament.

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At a previous meeting the United States representative, Mr. Stelle, made great efforts to prove that the main advantage of the United States proposals was their simplicity and their uniform approach to the various types of armaments. In his search for arguments to justify this approach, Mr. Stelle made an excursion into history. He called our attention to such a doubtful argument as the following:

"... the military establishments of various States have evolved in response to each country's own assessment of its own military requirements." (ENDC/PV.111, p.13)

In stating that thesis, however, Mr. Stelle omits to mention that the "military requirements" of the Western Powers are determined by their imperialistic policy, the policy of a position of strength, and not at all by considerations of national security. That is why we cannot at all agree with Mr. Stelle's assertion that:

"Different nations place different reliance on the various types of armaments -- whether they be nuclear, capable or conventional -- in safeguarding their national security." (ibid.)

It is no mere chance, therefore, that Mr. Stelle, in describing the so-called advantage of the United States approach, tried to speak in general terms, avoiding as far as possible any specific reference to the United States plan. We understand the reasons for such precaution on the part of the United States representative. Anyone who carefully examines the United States Outline of Basic Provisions of a Treaty can see that it is not at all conspicuous for its consistent and impartial approach, as Mr. Stelle has tried to make out.

Our approach to the solution of the problem of general and complete disarmament is well known, and there is no need for us to prove that the so-called principle of percentage reductions would not substantially change the existing state of affairs. We consider it to be unsatisfactory and if we have agreed to this principle in respect of conventional armaments, we have done so only as a concession to the Western Powers for the sake of speeding up agreement. In doing so, of course, we took into consideration the fact that conventional armaments cannot, by their nature, be compared with nuclear weapons -- that is, weapons of mass destruction -- or with the means of delivering them. In view of this fact, we consider that our concession to the Western Powers in regard to the application of percentage reductions to conventional armaments will not prejudice the solution of the main problem.

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Since we have already touched upon the arguments of the Western Powers, it will be appropriate to draw the attention of the Members of the Committee to the obvious lack of correspondence with reality of the assertions of Mr. Stelle and his United Kingdom colleague, Sir Paul Mason, that the Western Powers propose a proportional and equal reduction of the military establishments of States. In reality, their plan contains nothing of the kind. On the contrary, this plan would lead to disproportion and inequality, which would increase with each stage of disarmament.

We shall not say much about the fact that the United States is retreating from the principle of proportional reduction in respect of the number of armed forces. Apparently it considers that the application of this principle for the reduction of the number of armed forces would not be advantageous to the United States. This zigzag approach of the United States to methods of disarmament is so obvious that one can only marvel at the ease with which Mr. Stelle and Sir Paul Mason gloss over and disregard this fact, when they extol before the Committee their method of a so-called equal and proportional reduction of the military establishments of States.

Now let us turn to the question of nuclear weapons. In regard to these weapons, the Western Powers not only do not apply their own percentage method, but they even forget about it altogether, leaving nuclear weapons completely untouched right up to stage 3. Under the United States plan -- and this has been confirmed by the former representative of the United States in the Eighteen Nation Committee, Mr. Dean, as well as by Mr. Stelle -- no disarmament measures in regard to nuclear weapons are envisaged, either in the first or in the second stages. The United States envisages dealing with nuclear weapons only in the third stage of disarmament. Moreover, it proposes that first there should be carried out a complete inventory of all nuclear weapons in the possession of States. It is characteristic that this inventory of nuclear weapons under the United States plan is to be carried out in the absence of a firm obligation under a treaty regarding the actual destruction of existing stockpiles of nuclear weapons. Nowhere, in no section of the United States Outline of Basic Provisions of a Treaty will you find a firm and unconditional obligation to eliminate nuclear weapons or to prohibit their use. But there are reservations of various kinds, and more than enough. In order to avoid the actual destruction of nuclear weapons, the

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United States plan provides at least two loopholes, which strike one as soon as one begins to study the United States document. One of these loopholes is the possibility of transferring nuclear weapons to an international force. The other is the possibility of retaining these weapons in the national arsenals of States.

What grounds have we for saying this? The fact that the United States document makes the solution of the problem of eliminating nuclear weapons from the national armaments of States dependent on the findings of a group of experts studying the question of control over such elimination. That means that the experts from a country which is not disposed to give up nuclear weapons will always be able to assert under one pretext or another that they are not altogether sure of the reliability of control and on that ground they may refuse to adopt a decision, and, consequently, reject also the implementation of practical measures to eliminate nuclear weapons from national arsenals.

If we take into consideration all the above-mentioned circumstances, we see how completely groundless are Mr. Stelle's assertions that the United States is anxious to maintain the balance of forces in the course of disarmament and to avoid the creation of any unilateral advantage for any particular party to an agreement on disarmament. No, from the beginning to the end the United States outline of a treaty is aimed at ensuring advantages to the States possessing nuclear weapons. As regards nuclear weapons the United States plan would have the result that as its implementation proceeded the military advantages of the nuclear Powers would increase more and more in comparison with other parties to the agreement.

What a paradox! It is clear to everyone that the real threat of a nuclear war lies in the stockpiling of nuclear weapons, in the nuclear armaments race. Consequently, effective disarmament measures aimed at eliminating this threat must begin with the great Powers which possess nuclear weapons. But in the United States plan everything is arranged the other way round. As a result of its implementation the militarily strong nuclear Powers would become even stronger, while the smaller and militarily weaker States would go on disarming. The United States Outline of Basic Provisions of a Treaty is planned in such a way that, as time went on, the danger of a nuclear war would constantly increase and at the third stage, when, under the United States plan, all the smaller countries would be disarmed and conventional armaments would be destroyed, nuclear war

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would become the only possible type of war. Is this not paradoxical? Let us imagine the situation that would have come about by the end of stage 2 under the United States plan. The armed forces and conventional armaments of all States would be reduced by 65 per cent, and the manufacture of conventional armaments would be prohibited, as would the development of new types of such armaments. At the same time, the entire nuclear arsenal and most of the military bases on foreign territory, which are now at the disposal of the United States and the NATO military bloc, would remain intact. We would sin against the truth, if we said without any reservation that the nuclear arsenal would remain unaffected. That is not so. In fact it would grow. After all, under the United States plan, whereas in the first and second stages of disarmament the military establishments of the other non-nuclear States would be reduced, the United States would be able to continue manufacturing nuclear weapons and thus continue the stockpiling of weapons of an immense destructive force. Is it not clear that in such conditions wide possibilities would be opened up for the policy of a position of strength, for political blackmail and pressure on other States? That is the significance of the United States plan for "balanced" disarmament, for "disarmament in a peaceful world". It looks more like preparing the conditions for the establishment of the undisputed dictatorship and military and political domination of the nuclear Powers.

Now let us look at what the United States disarmament plan would lead to in the field of control. The United States representative, Mr. Stelle, assured us that the method of progressive reduction of armaments facilitated the task of solving the problem of control and made feasible the creation of a system of control which "would not require undue disclosure of information pertaining to national security of States" (ENDC/PV.111, p.13)

That is what Mr. Stelle said. However, when Mr. Stelle came to describe the procedure of control under the United States plan, the picture he painted completely upset all these assertions of his. In reality, the United States is trying to obtain the utmost possible information about the defence systems of other States while carrying out the minimum of disarmament measures. Let us see what Mr. Stelle said as it appears on page 14 of the verbatim record of the one hundred and eleventh meeting. Mr. Stelle said:

"The reduction would take place in three steps, each consisting of one year". (ibid, p.14)

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That means that the first stage of disarmament would in fact comprise three separate stages. Thus, under the United States Outline of Basic Provisions, one year after the beginning of disarmament certain categories of armaments -- conventional armaments and certain nuclear weapon delivery vehicles -- would be reduced by only 10 per cent. At best, the military power of States would be reduced by 10 per cent and at the worst, even that would not take place, because used and obsolete weapons and military equipment could be got rid of under the guise of reduction. As for nuclear weapons, their stock-piles could even be increased to the amount produced during that year in accordance with the allowance laid down in the United States plan.

Let us see what else Mr. Stelle had to say. I quote his words:

"The reductions would be subject to agreed arrangements for verification by the international disarmament organization, including arrangements to assure the parties that the agreed levels of retained armaments were not exceeded." (ibid. 111, p.14)

The first part of that sentence does not give rise to any doubts. It concerns verification of the 10 per cent reduction of armaments. No one can have any objection to these control measures.

But let us now consider the second part of Mr. Stelle's sentence, namely " ... including arrangements to assure the parties that the agreed levels of retained armaments were not exceeded". (ibid) What would that mean in practice? It means that control must be exercised over the entire remaining 90 per cent of armaments. References to the possibility of so-called zonal control do not alter the substance of the matter, because it remains a fact that the party interested in gathering intelligence information on the defence potential of the other party would have the possibility of demanding inspection of a considerable part of the territory of that State. All this could be covered up with the pretext that it was not completely certain that the levels of remaining armaments -- missiles, for example -- had not been exceeded. That is how the real picture would look under the United States plan: armaments would be reduced by 10 per cent, but control would apply to the whole, that is 100 per cent. In practice it would be nothing but unrestricted military espionage and, moreover, legalized by the disarmament treaty.

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Thus the system of control which Mr. Stelle has described to us in no way corresponds to the real tasks of control over disarmament measures, and it would be more correct to call it a system for finding out, a system for collecting intelligence information, a system for selecting the targets in which NATO is interested in order to deliver a blow. In this respect the United States plan is, as it were, an instrument of the policy which is being discussed so openly in the West at the present time. We have already had occasion to read in articles by various Western correspondents that the re-construction of the military strategy of NATO in connexion with the plan to create a multilateral or multi-national nuclear force requires the pin-pointing of the targets for nuclear blows. Even leading statesmen of NATO member countries are now openly speaking about this. Speaking in the NATO Council on 20 March, only a week ago, the Foreign Minister of the United Kingdom, Lord Home, stated the following, according to The Times;

"European members would have a bigger part in target policy, and could influence the choice of targets to which they attach importance.

Targetting policy, he suggested, could also cover a wide range of tactical nuclear weapons. This was no mere paper exercise, he said."

No great perspicacity is needed to realize that in the matter of selecting and pin-pointing the targets for the delivery of a nuclear blow, these Western leaders do not assign the least important role to inspection on the territory of the Soviet Union and other socialist countries. Any particular disarmament proposal should be considered not in a vacuum but with due regard to the actual policy pursued by its authors. Of course, in evaluating the proposals of the Western Powers we cannot leave out of account their actual policy and plans which have been revealed, in particular, by the Foreign Minister of the United Kingdom, Lord Home, in his statement in the NATO Council which I have just cited.

Those are the characteristic peculiarities of the United States disarmament plan. That plan as a whole bears the undisguised marks of militarism. But modern militarism is much more destructive to mankind than the militarism which prevailed in world politics in the second half of the last century and in the first half of the twentieth century. If that militarism led to two world wars which cost humanity many tens of millions of lives, the militarism of today -- unless it is stopped in time, that is to say right now --

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will inevitably lead to the monstrous Armageddon of a nuclear missile war. No one has any doubt that in the conflagration of such a war, should it break out, hundreds of millions of people would perish in a few minutes and flourishing countries and nations would vanish from the face of the earth.

Everything must be done to prevent that happening. The great historic responsibility for the fate of the world demands of us courageous and resolute action aimed at destroying as quickly as possible the machinery of war. That was precisely the consideration by which the Soviet Union was guided in working out its disarmament proposals. Only radical, far-reaching measures from the very outset can prevent mankind from sliding dangerously and with ever increasing speed towards the abyss of war. We know the argument of the Western Powers in favour of their disarmament plan. Here it is. They insist on a gradual, balanced plan of disarmament which -- as the representative of the United States, Mr. Stelle, stated -- would not require any significant change in the pattern of the existing mix of armaments and would maintain unchanged the existing military balance. We have just shown by a concrete analysis of the factual material that the United States plan would lead to bringing about in the world a situation fraught with great possibilities for unleashing a nuclear war in all the stages of disarmament. What disarmament is there if, even after its completion, nuclear war remains possible? Such is the disarmament plan proposed by the United States, and the words of the United Kingdom representative, Sir Paul Mason, at the meeting on 22 March (ENDC/PV.112, pp.5-6), really sounded like a mockery of disarmament when he urged us to accept these Western disarmament proposals.

The aforementioned characteristics of the United States disarmament proposals confirm that they cannot serve as a useful basis for an agreement on general and complete disarmament. It is impossible to take as a basis for disarmament proposals which in substance deny disarmament itself. On the other hand, the Soviet Union's proposals aimed at ridding the world as quickly as possible of the threat of war are a sound basis for working out an agreement on general and complete disarmament.

(Mr. Tsarapkin, USSR)

During the discussion which took place last year we made many endeavours and efforts to enable the other parties to the negotiations to understand fully the substance of the Soviet Government's proposal that the Soviet Union and the United States of America should retain an agreed number of certain types of missiles up to the end of the second stage. The documents submitted by us on this subject and the explanations we have given provide a sufficiently clear and complete picture of the substance of our proposal. For this reason we consider that there is already a possibility for reaching an agreement in principle, after which the way will be open for discussing and working out all the practical details.

Frankly speaking, we are somewhat surprised by the attitude of the representative of the Western Powers, who continue to insist on additional explanations of the Soviet proposal. This attitude seems all the more strange, as the principle of the Soviet proposal is perfectly clear. However, in order to speed up the work of the Committee, we are ready to assist them and to answer again the questions which they put to us at a previous meeting (ENDC/PV.113).

The representatives of the Western Powers asked us, in particular, to explain what quantity of missiles we envisaged being retained by the Soviet Union and the United States of America during the second stage of disarmament. Our answer is that we prefer first to reach an agreement with the Western Powers in regard to the principle of the matter. For such a solution the Western Powers already have all the necessary data. We have already submitted to them the main information on the principle underlying this proposal. We have already pointed out and consider it necessary to emphasize once more that the Soviet proposal envisages an agreed number of intercontinental missiles, anti-missile missiles and anti-aircraft missiles in the ground-to-air category. The main criterion which we suggest as the guiding principle in determining the number of missiles to be retained is that the quantity should be minimal so that, while being an additional guarantee against aggression, it could not at the same time serve the purposes of war or make possible the implementation of aggressive designs. The quantity of missiles to be retained should correspond to the needs of such a guarantee against a breach of the peace by one side or the other, or against the violation of commitments under the treaty on general and complete disarmament. We proposed a principle or, if you like, an approach, a criterion, guided by which we would have no particular difficulty in determining jointly a specific number of missiles of the types we have mentioned which would be retained by

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the Soviet Union and the United States until the end of the second stage. In this connexion we should like to remind members of the Committee once more that the remaining agreed number of missiles should be located only on the territory proper of the Soviet Union and the United States and nowhere else. We are ready to listen to the views of the Western Powers on the question of the number of remaining missiles of the types we have mentioned, but, of course, only on the basis of the criteria we have indicated.

That is our position of principle. On that basis we are ready to seek agreement with the Western Powers and to hear their views on the subject.

As the representatives of the Western Powers have stated on many occasions, they attach great importance to the question of control. When considering the Soviet Government's proposal of December 1962, the representatives of the United States and the United Kingdom persistently emphasized that their Governments' attitude towards this proposal would be determined to a great extent by whether the Soviet Union envisaged effective control over the remaining missiles. Thus, for instance, at the meeting of 10 December 1962, Mr. Stelle, when asking us what the control measures would be, stated:

"... an indication of the Soviet Union's attitudes on that question would contribute importantly to an assessment of the potential and implications of its new proposal." (ENDC/PV.90, p.33)

At a previous meeting the representatives of the United States and the United Kingdom again asked us what control we envisage over the missiles which, under the Soviet proposal, would remain temporarily in the Soviet Union and the United States. We are ready to make that quite clear so that no one should have any doubts about it.

In the interests of reaching agreement the Soviet Union is ready to take a considerable step to meet the position of the Western Powers on this issue as well. The Soviet Union is willing to agree to the establishment of control over the remaining missiles directly at the launching pads. It considers that such launching pads should not be more numerous than the remaining missiles. Of course, the launching pads should be eliminated at the end of the second stage together with the missiles themselves.

The Soviet delegation has given clear and direct answers to the questions put to us by the Western Powers. Now there can be no further reference to a lack of clarity in our proposal or to a lack of clarity in regard to the conditions of control. Thus, the Western Powers have all the necessary information to determine their position in

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regard to the Soviet Union's proposal which was submitted by the Minister for Foreign Affairs of the Soviet Union, Mr. Gromyko, at the United Nations General Assembly on 21 September 1962. A positive answer by the Western Powers will open up for the Committee the possibility of making considerable progress in reaching agreement on the first stage of general and complete disarmament. A successful outcome of the negotiations on measures for the first stage of disarmament depends now on the answer of the Western Powers.

Mr. STELLE (United States of America): In view of the lateness of the hour I shall be very brief indeed. I should like to comment on only two points in what has been said this morning by representatives.

First, I cannot let pass without an immediate reply the inaccurate and misleading description which was just given by the Soviet representative of how the United States disarmament plan deals with nuclear weapons and nuclear materials. As I heard him through the interpreter, he said that our plan would in effect make possible an increase in nuclear capabilities, and an increase in stockpiles of nuclear weapons as conventional armaments are reduced. That is, of course, patently not the case; and I should merely like very briefly to draw the attention of representatives to the provisions under the United States plan:

Tristage I:

"The Parties to the Treaty would halt the production of fissionable materials for use in nuclear weapons." (ENDC/30, p.8);

"... Production of fissionable materials for purposes other than use in nuclear weapons would be limited to agreed levels. (ibid);

"... Upon the cessation of production of fissionable materials for use in nuclear weapons ..." there would be a transfer of "... an agreed quantity of weapons-grade U-235 from past production" to peaceful purposes.

(ibid., p.9)

That obviously would not allow of any increase in the nuclear weapons and fissionable materials but, through the transfer provision, would provide, through an agreed quantity, for a decrease of fissionable materials.

(Mr. Stells, United States)

In stage II:

"... the Parties to the Treaty would undertake to reduce in the following manner remaining nuclear weapons and fissionable materials for use in nuclear weapons: (ibid., p.23)

"... The Parties ... would reduce the amounts and types of fissionable materials declared for use in nuclear weapons to minimum levels on the basis of agreed percentages. (ibid.)

"... The Parties to the Treaty would destroy the non-nuclear components and assemblies of nuclear weapons from which fissionable materials had been removed to effect the foregoing reduction of fissionable materials for use in nuclear weapons." (ibid., p.24)

In stage III -- and I shall read only one sentence --

"In light of the steps taken in stages I and II to halt the production of fissionable material for use in nuclear weapons and to reduce nuclear weapons stockpiles, the Parties to the Treaty would eliminate all nuclear weapons remaining at their disposal". (ibid., p.29)

I think that those provisions in the plan, which are of course familiar to the Soviet delegation, make it clear that the statement this morning was quite inaccurate.

With regard to the question of the Gromyko proposal (A/PV.1127 (provisional), p.38-40) for the retention of an unspecified number of nuclear delivery vehicles until the end of stage II, our Italian colleague today (supra, pp.13-16) gave a very helpful analysis of the Soviet proposal. He repeated that the Western delegations have asked a series of questions on it to which we have not had, as yet, any replies; and today we did not receive any real answer to some of those questions. We have received the answer -- the all too familiar answer -- which we have also unfortunately received on other aspects of these negotiations: "Agree in principle and the details will fall into place."

In the closing section of his statement the Soviet representative said he was replying to the request of the Western delegations that he clarify the Soviet position on the verification of retained levels of nuclear delivery vehicles under the Gromyko proposal. In part because of what I cannot believe was a completely accurate interpretation, I should like to study the verbatim record of what the Soviet representative had to say. If it represented a move forward towards an inspection, towards a real verification of retained levels, then my delegation will of course want to give it the most serious study. What I heard did not lead me to that conclusion. But, as I say, I should like to study what the precise words of the Soviet representative were.

The CHAIRMAN (Poland): I now call on the representative of Romania to exercise his right of reply.

Mr. MACOVESCU (Romania): The representative of Italy honoured me today by referring to part of the speech which I made at our last meeting and by some comments with regard to some of the ideas I then expressed. I do not intend today to enter, at this late hour, into a debate in merito of the comments made by Mr. Cavalletti. All I want to say at this juncture is that I do not understand very well exactly what Mr. Cavalletti intended to oppose and what he intended to stress.

In my last statement (ENDC/PV.112, pp.11-15) I pointed out that our further arrangements with regard to disarmament must be based on the principles of the United Nations Charter and on no account on any international body of a supranational character which would encroach upon the sovereignty of States. I should be very grateful if the representative of Italy, Mr. Cavalletti, could explain to us whether he stands for the principles of the United Nations Charter or for new international bodies which would ignore those principles, tending towards encroachment upon the sovereignty of States.

The CHAIRMAN (Poland): I think I am entitled to draw the conclusion that the representative of Romania is not asking the representative of Italy to give a reply to that question immediately.

Mr. CAVALLETTI (Italy) (translation from French): I shall reply at another meeting to the question put to me by the Romanian representative. I think that the statement which I made today is clear enough. When Mr. Macovescu reads the verbatim record he will no doubt follow my line of thought. In any case my delegation reserves the right to revert to this question of the organization of peace later, when we have completed certain studies on which we are now engaged.

Mr. TSARAPKIN (Union of Soviet Socialist Republics) (translation from Russian): The United States representative tried just now to cast doubt on the correctness of our assessment of the United States disarmament plan. He tried to make out that the United States provided in its plan for the reduction of nuclear weapons not only in stage III but also in the earlier stages of disarmament. I must say quite

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categorically, however, that Mr. Stelle's assertion is untrue; it contradicts the content of the United States disarmament plan. The United States representative is trying to confuse two questions -- the question of the production of fissionable materials and the question of the production of nuclear weapons. However, I shall now do my best to prevent Mr. Stelle from confusing the issue.

The future production of fissionable materials which you provide for has no relation to the production of nuclear weapons from the already accumulated immense stockpiles of fissionable materials. Under your plan the production of nuclear weapons will continue in the first and second stages and its cessation will begin only in the third stage. I should like to draw attention to the fact that the question of the future production of fissionable materials is not a synonym of the question of the production of nuclear weapons; they are different things. It is quite possible to reduce the production of fissionable materials in the future, but in the United States you already have in stockpiles such an immense quantity of fissionable materials not yet converted into nuclear weapons that you would be able to manufacture nuclear weapons for a whole decade at the same rate as you are doing today. That is the real situation. Therefore, Mr. Stelle, although you say that your plan provides for a reduction in the production of fissionable materials for military purposes or the transfer of part of the fissionable materials to peaceful purposes and so on, it will not reduce the already accumulated stocks of nuclear weapons of various types and will not affect in any substantial way the production of nuclear weapons in the first and second stages of disarmament. In this regard I should like to make this question quite clear. Your attempt to refute the assertions and the assessment of the United States plan which we put forward in our statement fails completely. It is in contradiction with the real situation and with what is laid down in your plan, Mr. Stelle.

Mr. STELLE (United States of America): I should like to say just a word. If the Soviet representative knows how to make nuclear weapons without fissionable materials he might enlighten us and enlighten the Committee; we should be interested to hear his views on the subject.

(Mr. Stelle, United States)

There is obviously a relationship between fissionable materials and nuclear weapons and that relationship is made precise in stage II of the United States plan, a stage in which Mr. Tsarapkin said there was no reduction of nuclear weapons. In our plan it is stated -- and this follows the cut-off of production of fissionable materials in stage I and a transfer of agreed amounts of fissionable materials to peaceful purposes -- that in stage II:

"b. The Parties to the Treaty would reduce the amounts and types of fissionable materials declared for use in nuclear weapons to minimum levels on the basis of agreed percentages." (ENDC/30, p.23)
We think that that would involve an actual reduction in nuclear weapons and that thought is made clear by the following provision:

"c. The Parties to the Treaty would destroy the non-nuclear components and assemblies of nuclear weapons from which fissionable materials had been removed to effect the foregoing reduction of fissionable materials for use in nuclear weapons." (ibid., p.24)
I submit that there is a relationship between fissionable materials and nuclear weapons.

Mr. TSARAPKIN (Union of Soviet Socialist Republics) (translation from Russian): I am going to answer Mr. Stelle. Fortunately I cannot teach you how to manufacture nuclear weapons without fissionable materials. And it is just as well that I cannot. But how to manufacture nuclear weapons from the immense stockpiles of fissionable materials which you have already accumulated in the United States is something, I think, which everyone realizes can be done, if you have the necessary know-how.

As regards your attempt once again to make out that your plan provides for the cessation of production and the destruction of stockpiles of nuclear weapons, that is not true. All the accumulated stockpiles of nuclear weapons in the United States will not be reduced or destroyed either in stage I or in stage II. Immense stockpiles of weapons, monstrous in their destructive power, that is atomic and hydrogen bombs, are in your arsenals and, under your plan, are to remain there intact during both stage I and stage II. That is a fact.

Mr. GODBER (United Kingdom): At some later stage I should certainly like to have the opportunity of coming back to a number of points made by the representative of the Soviet Union this morning. All I want to do now is to express my surprise at the tactics which he is at present adopting.

It is well known that we reverted to items 5(b) and 5(c) of our agenda (ENDC/L/Add.3) to enable us to evaluate more fully the proposals (A/PV.1127 (provisional), p.38-40) made by Mr. Gromyko last autumn at the General Assembly of the United Nations. That I thought was the purpose of our present discussion. I thought it very significant that Mr. Tsarapkin for almost the whole of his speech this morning spent his time in abusing the Western position by seeking to put a very highly coloured interpretation upon it.

What I would say, however, is that presumably we shall have ample opportunity of going into the relative merits of the proposals of the two sides in relation to nuclear weapons when we come back to item 5(d). I am only surprised that our Soviet colleague is so coy in relation to his own proposals that he has to make most of his speeches attacking those of the West on an item when we had in fact come back specifically to discuss a Soviet proposal.

Naturally, I shall study with care the very few remarks he made towards the end of his speech on that subject. Like my United States colleague, I hope that it will lead us forward, but, as I understood it, he seemed to be concentrating on the verification of the actual declared remaining arms without any mention whatever of how one could tell whether they were being added to by others undeclared. However, as I say, I should like to study his statement. I merely wanted to draw attention to the fact that our Soviet colleague was more interested in criticizing the Western plan on another item to which we shall be coming shortly, than in telling us more about his own proposals.

The CHAIRMAN (Poland): I am sure that this meeting has given all of us much material for study. As the members of the Committee are aware, the meetings on Wednesdays are, in accordance with the decision taken by the two co-Chairmen, devoted to the discussion of problems related to general and complete disarmament, so that I am sure the representative of the United Kingdom will have ample opportunity to comment on all the problems which have been raised today.

The Conference decided to issue the following communique:

"The Conference of the Eighteen-Nation Committee on Disarmament today held its one hundred and fourteenth plenary meeting in the Palais des Nations, Geneva, under the chairmanship of Mr. Blusztajn, the representative of Poland.

"Statements were made by the representatives of Bulgaria, Italy, Czechoslovakia, the Soviet Union, the United States, Romania and the United Kingdom.

"The next meeting of the Conference will be held on Friday, 29 March 1963, at 10.30 a.m."

The meeting rose at 1.25 p.m.

